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12 
34 
4 Abstract 5 
6 
7 It is a common time management problem that people underestimate the duration of tasks, which 
8 
9 has been termed the “planning fallacy.” To overcome this, it has been suggested that people 10 
11 should be informed about how long they previously worked on the same task. This study, 
13 
14 however, tests whether previous misestimation also affects the duration estimation of a novel 
15 
16 task, even if the feedback is only self-generated. To test this, two groups of participants 17 
18 
19 performed two unrelated, laboratory-based tasks in succession. Learning was manipulated by 
20 
21 permitting only the experimental group to retrospectively estimate the duration of the first task 22 
23 
24 before predicting the duration of the second task. Results showed that the experimental group 
25 
26 underestimated the duration of the second task less than the control group, which indicates a 27 
28 
29 general kind of learning from previous misestimation. The findings imply that people could be 
30 
31 trained to carefully observe how much they misestimate task duration in order to stimulate 
32 
33 learning. The findings are discussed in relation to the anchoring account of task duration 
35 
36 misestimation and the memory-bias account of the planning fallacy. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Keywords: planning fallacy; time management; time estimation 
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were instructed to consider elements common to previous and current/focal tasks. They argue 
that this technique enabled participants to consider potential impediments to task completion 
(e.g., computer failure), which resulted in less biased predictions. 
An alternative account of the planning fallacy and task duration prediction bias more 
generally comes from research which indicates that people do consider information about their 
 
 
12 
34 
4 One of the problems that makes time management (Koch and Kleinmann 2002) so 5 
6 
7 difficult is the planning fallacy: the tendency to underestimate future task duration despite 
8 
9 knowing that previous tasks overran (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Considerable research (e.g., 10 
11 Buehler et al. 1997; Burt and Kemp 1994; Halkjelsvik et al. 2011; König 2005; Roy et al. 2008; 
13 
14 Thomas et al. 2004; Weick and Guinote 2010; for recent overviews see Buehler et al. 2010, and 
15 
16 Halkjelsvik and Jørgensen 2012) has almost universally found that tasks take longer than 17 
18 
19 predicted, and this has been observed on various laboratory and real world tasks including 
20 
21 writing college assignments (e.g., Buehler et al. 1994) and shopping for gifts (Kruger and Evans 22 
23 
24 2004). Such underestimation of task duration may cause serious problems; for example, students 
25 
26 may start to work on assignments too late to achieve good grades and gifts bought in the rush 27 
28 
29 may not have the anticipated consequences (see Kruger and Evans 2004). 
30 
31 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have suggested that two types of data are available 
32 
33 when predicting task duration: singular information (i.e., aspects of the focal task) and 
35 
36 distributional information (i.e., information about previous tasks). They argue that the planning 
37 
38 fallacy occurs because predictions are based on singular information whilst distributional 39 
40 
41 information is ignored or neglected.  In support of this account, Buehler et al. (1994) analysed 
42 
43 verbal protocols and found that previous tasks were rarely given as reasons for task duration 44 
45 
46 predictions. Moreover, Buehler et al. found that underestimation was reduced when participants 
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previously taken on the same task reduced prediction bias. This suggests that if people are told 
about the length of previous tasks, their memory is corrected and their predictions on the next 
task are less biased. 
Although the anchoring and memory-bias accounts are valuable additions to the task 
duration prediction literature by highlighting the role of previous task performance or duration, it 
 
 
12 
34 
4 previous task performance, but still mispredict task duration (König 2005; Thomas and Handley 5 
6 
7 2008; see also Thomas et al. 2007). This account, which is based on the anchoring and 
8 
9 adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), posits that predictions are anchored/based 10 
11 on the duration of previous tasks but are insufficiently adjusted according to the demands of the 
13 
14 focal task, resulting in the underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy when previous tasks 
15 
16 are shorter than focal tasks and overestimation when previous tasks are longer than focal tasks. 17 
18 
19 In support of this account, König (2005) found that prediction bias on a catalogue-searching task 
20 
21 differed according to whether a previously-presented number represented a shorter or longer 22 
23 
24 duration, with underestimation or overestimation occurring, respectively. Similarly, Thomas and 
25 
26 Handley (2008) found this anchoring effect when numbers represented the duration of similar or 27 
28 
29 different tasks to focal tasks. These studies indicate that information about previous tasks (i.e., 
30 
31 duration) can bias predictions of task duration, suggesting that prediction bias is not due to 
32 
33 information about previous tasks being neglected or overlooked (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
35 
36 The anchoring account (e.g., König 2005) has similarities with the memory-bias 
37 
38 account of the planning fallacy (Roy et al. 2005b), which also emphasizes the role of previous 39 
40 
41 task performance or duration. The memory-bias account posits that people mispredict task 
42 
43 duration because they base their predictions on incorrect memories about previous, similar tasks. 44 
45 
46 In support of the account, Roy et al. (2008) found that informing people of how long they had 
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reduce prediction bias because of people’s general capacity to learn from mistakes (e.g., Fischer 
et al. 2006; Gick and McGarry 1992; Keith and Frese 2008). If they have previously 
underestimated the duration of a task, they can refer to this insight when making a new 
prediction about the duration of an upcoming task. For example, a lecturer might realize that it 
took much longer to grade student essays than expected, and this experience might make the 
 
 
12 
34 
4 seems sensible to question whether the results of the supporting studies generalize to everyday 5 
6 
7 life situations in which people often work on one task and then on another, different task. 
8 
9 Participants in experiments may count two stacks of 500 sheets of paper twice (see Roy et al. 10 
11 2008, Experiment 1) or build two versions of the same toy castle in succession (see Thomas et al. 
13 
14 2007, Experiment 1), but such repetition might not be common in everyday life. For example, 
15 
16 even if a researcher has to count the stacks of paper of a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that she 17 
18 
19 wants to distribute, this counting task is likely not to be followed by another counting task for the 
20 
21 next study, but by another, different task (e.g., statistical analyses of data for a manuscript). 22 
23 
24 Furthermore, researchers provided external duration feedback to participants in 
25 
26 previous anchoring account studies (Thomas and Handley 2008; see also König 2005) and Roy 27 
28 
29 et al.’s (2008) study, but such external feedback is likely to often be absent from everyday 
30 
31 situations. Although telling participants about the duration matched exactly what the 
32 
33 aforementioned studies wanted to show, what happens if there is no external feedback? Without 
35 
36 external feedback, the duration of a task may be sometimes be salient and sometimes not. If, for 
37 
38 example, people regularly consult their watches, they might have a fairly good idea of how long 39 
40 
41 a task took. In other situations, people may only vaguely guess how long they needed to finish a 
42 
43 task. This implies that self-generated feedback is likely to be less precise than external feedback. 44 
45 
46 Nevertheless, self-generated feedback about the duration of a different task might still 
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previously-presented duration anchor or misremembered memory trace of a previous task). The 
accounts therefore imply that underestimation will not occur or prediction bias will be reduced 
when there is no previous task experience. However, as anchor values that are self-generated can 
influence non-temporal judgements (e.g., Epley and Gilovich 2005), anchoring could also 
explain why learning from mistakes on previous tasks can influence task duration prediction 
 
 
12 
34 
4 lecturer less optimistic how much time they will need to plan the next lecture. In such a situation, 5 
6 
7 the lecturer learns from previous underestimation and such learning occurs without the 
8 
9 intervention of someone else (e.g., a teaching assistant) telling the lecturer how long lecture 10 
11 planning took previously. 
13 
14 That people can learn from previous errors (i.e., via feedback) is a fundamental idea 
15 
16 that can be found in many psychological theories. For example, a central idea in Skinner’s 17 
18 
19 (1938) learning theory is that positive or negative reinforcement (i.e., feedback) increases or 
20 
21 decreases behavior. Thus, if people make an error and get feedback, this decreases the 22 
23 
24 probability of making the error again. Similarly, Carver and Scheier’s (1982, 1998) control 
25 
26 theory relies on a discrepancy-reducing feedback loop, where feedback about the previous 27 
28 
29 success of behavior is used for decisions about future self-regulated behavior. Our argument is 
30 
31 therefore that such learning from errors also happens in the context of making task duration 
32 
33 predictions. This learning could be more explicit or more implicit: People might be aware that 
35 
36 their last prediction was too optimistic or people might just be sensitized about the danger of 
37 
38 making too optimistic predictions, without consciously thinking about it. 39 
40 
41 The idea that people learn from previous underestimation goes beyond the anchoring 
42 
43 (e.g., Thomas and Handley 2008) and memory-bias accounts (Roy et al. 2005b), which require 44 
45 
46 the presence of some information upon which the prediction of the upcoming task is based (i.e., a 
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analysis (i.e., a large Cook-distance value). Of the remaining 63 participants, 53 were female and 
10 were male. The sample’s average age was 24.59 years (SD = 6.41). Most of the participants 
were psychology students (n = 57), three were studying journalism, one studied agronomy, one 
political science, and one law. Forty-three participants had just started studying, 10 were in the 
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34 
4 bias. This would happen by generating time predictions based on the perceived duration of 5 
6 
7 previous tasks and adjusting these predictions according to the demands of the focal task. This 
8 
9 self-learning effect could reduce or increase prediction bias depending on the relative durations 10 
11 of previous and focal tasks but would occur regardless of the similarity of the focal task to 
13 
14 previous tasks. 
15 
16 To test this self-learning effect, we had participants work on two dissimilar tasks. All 17 
18 
19 participants had to estimate prospectively the duration of the first task, but only half of them 
20 
21 were also asked to retrospectively estimate the duration. Then, we measured how much 22 
23 
24 participants underestimated or overestimated the new, upcoming task. More formally, we 
25 
26 hypothesised: 27 
28 
29 The duration of an upcoming new task is misestimated less if participants have 
30 
31 to retrospectively estimate the duration of a just-completed task than if they do 
32 
33 not have to retrospectively estimate the duration of a just-completed task. 
35 
36 
37 
38 Method 39 
40 
41 Participants 
42 
43 The sample consisted of 64 students from a Swiss university, who participated 44 
45 
46 voluntarily. One participant had to be excluded from the data analyses according to an outlier 
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not a tendency to overestimate the duration of this task. 
In the present study, the experimenter put the whole LEGO® Creator Set “Wild animals” 
on a table. Then, the experimenter classified pieces in the colours light grey, dark grey and black 
according to a picture of the completed bird of prey in order to avoid confusion regarding these 
colours. After that, the experimenter showed the participant the picture of the completed bird of 
 
 
12 
34 
4 third and 10 in the fifth or in a higher semester of their studies. All participants were entered in a 5 
6 
7 prize draw to win a watch, and psychology students also received course credit for participating. 
8 
9 Tasks 10 
11 Two tasks were used: a LEGO® assembly task (with LEGO® being a trademark of the 
13 
14 LEGO Group, Billund, Denmark) and a colouring task. The two tasks were counterbalanced. 
15 
16 Task selection was based on the following three criteria. First, as has been shown (e.g. Roy et al. 17 
18 
19 2005b), the tendency to underestimate the duration of a task can be observed when participants 
20 
21 need at least 12.5 minutes to complete a task. Hence, the tasks used in this study should last at 22 
23 
24 least 12.5 minutes. Second, so that participants could not rely on the duration of the just- 
25 
26 completed first task when predicting how long it would take them to complete the second task, 27 
28 
29 the tasks should be dissimilar. Third, it might be problematic if task duration can be calculated 
30 
31 on the basis of countable units. As we will outline below, both tasks fulfilled these criteria. 
32 
33 LEGO® assembly task. Following Hinds (1999) and Roy (2003), participants had to 
35 
36 piece together the 81-piece bird of prey figure from the LEGO® Creator Set “Wild animals” (No. 
37 
38 4884-1). Roughly a third of all pieces in the set are needed to assemble this animal. In a pretest 39 
40 
41 (N = 19), participants needed 25.32 minutes on average (SD = 6.75) to complete this task. 
42 
43 Furthermore, they underestimated (in minutes) the task duration both prospectively (M = 16.74, 44 
45 
46 SD = 13.54) and retrospectively (M = 22.63, SD = 6.27). Hence, it can be assumed that there is 
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they would have to complete and what exactly was measured. 
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were asked to switch off their 
cellular phone and to put their watch out of sight to reduce interferences during the data 
collection. Furthermore, they were asked whether they suffered from colour blindness. One 
participant admitted colour-blindness but identified all colours correctly when tested. Since the 
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4 prey and asked the participant to estimate how many minutes it would take them to assemble that 5 
6 
LEGO® figure with the aid of an instruction manual. Afterwards, the participant was asked to 
8 
9 start with the task and to complete it properly. 10 
11 Colouring task. This involved colouring a dinosaur template according to a coloured 
13 
14 master copy. In a pre-test (N = 8), the average time for completion of this task was 22.63 minutes 
15 
16 (SD = 5.18), which exceeds the necessary 12.5 minutes (Roy et al. 2005b). In the study, the 17 
18 
19 experimenter first presented the coloured master copy as well as the to-be-coloured template to 
20 
21 participants and prepared the coloured crayons and the pencil sharpener. Again, the experimenter 22 
23 
24 compared the yellow, orange and red coloured crayons, which were easy to confuse, with the 
25 
26 corresponding colours on the master copy. After that, participants were asked (in everyday 27 
28 
29 language) to colour the template exactly according to the master copy, but neither to be too 
30 
31 exacting nor to make mistakes. 
32 
33 Procedure 
35 
36 Data were collected in individual sessions for which one and a half hours were scheduled. 
37 
38 Participants were informed that the study was about time management and that it addressed the 39 
40 
41 question of how people deal with time. Participants would complete different tasks and fill in 
42 
43 questionnaires. In order to avoid participants being able to compute the duration of the two tasks 44 
45 
46 based on the duration of the whole experiment, they were not informed about how many tasks 
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draw, respectively, in their childhood and how often they had done these activities since their 
childhood (1 = never, 5 = very often). All participants indicated that they used to draw more 
often (M = 3.97, SD = 1.12) than they used to play with LEGO® (M = 3.17, SD = 1.21) as a 
child, t(62) = -3.78 , p < .001. Participants also indicated more drawing (M = 2.98, SD = 1.09) 
than LEGO® playing (M = 1.49, SD = .78) since childhood, t(62) = -9.16 , p < .001. More 
 
 
12 
34 
46 
4 data of this participant were not peculiar in any way, this participant was not excluded from the 5 
6 
7 data analyses. 
8 
9 Participants were randomly assigned to four groups: two groups (an experimental and a 10 
11 control group) starting with the LEGO® task and two groups (an experimental and a control 
13 
14 group) starting with the colouring task (see also Figure 1 for a flow chart for the main part of the 
15 
16 study). First, all participants were asked to predict how many minutes it would take them to 17 
18 
19 complete the first task (LEGO® or colouring task) and then to perform it. Only the experimental 
20 
21 groups also had to estimate the duration of the first task retrospectively. Immediately after this, 22 
23 
24 all groups were introduced to the second task (task not performed first) and asked to predict its 
25 
26 duration and then to perform it. The actual times for completion of the first and second tasks 27 
28 
29 were unobtrusively measured by the experimenter using a stopwatch. When the participants 
30 
31 signalled completion of the task, the stopwatch was stopped and the experimenter checked 
32 
33 whether the task was properly completed. If a task was not finished appropriately (e.g., pieces of 
35 
36 the bird were still missing), participants were asked to correct such errors and the stopwatch was 
37 
38 re-started from the point at which it had been stopped. All participants were also asked to 39 
40 
41 estimate the duration of the second task retrospectively. 
42 
43 After the second task, control question was asked, participants had to indicate on a five- 44 
45 
point Likert-scale how often they used to play with LEGO® bricks and how often they used to 
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proportional error indicates overestimation. If the proportional error is zero, then estimated and 
actual task duration are equal (i.e., no bias). Thus, the greater the proportional error deviates 
from zero, the larger the bias. 
 
 
7 
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34 
6 
LEGO® or with drawing, both ts < 1, and they did not differ in the extent of LEGO® playing or 
8 
9 drawing in later years, both ts < 1. 10 
11 Since we had invited participants for a study of one and a half hours and since we did not 
13 
14 want participants to use this information when estimating task duration, we filled the remaining 
15 
16 time (if necessary) with a “two minutes task” and a questionnaire. The “two minute task” means 17 
18 
19 that participants had to state when a two-minute period was over (see Block and Zakay 1997). 
20 
21 The experimenter indicated the start of the two minutes and, at the same time, activated a 22 
23 
24 stopwatch. When participants signalled the assumed end of the two minutes, the experimenter 
25 
26 stopped the stopwatch. Furthermore, participants were kept busy by filling out the Time 27 
28 
29 Management Behavior Scale (Macan 1994, in its German version, König and Kleinmann 2006). 
30 
31 Dependent Variable 
32 
33 To measure misestimation, we used the proportional error (Roy 2003), which is 
35 
36 calculated as follows: 
37 
38 
39 
40 Proportional error of predicted task = 41 duration (PEprediction) 
42 
43 
44 
45 
predicted task duration – actual task duration 
actual task duration 
46 A negative proportional error indicates underestimation of task duration and a positive 
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main effects for experimental vs. control group variable nor for the control variable (i.e., order or 
tasks). In addition, the task 1 vs. task 2 × order of tasks interaction was significant. The estimated 
marginal means of this interaction were -0.44 for the LEGO® task as the first task, -0.33 for the 
colouring task as the first task, -0.16 for colouring task as the second task, and -0.28 for the 
LEGO® task as the second task, and post-hoc comparison with a Sidak correction revealed that 
 
 
27 
32 
6 
7 Table 1 contains basic descriptive statistics. The negative values of the two proportional 
8 
9 error of predicted duration in Table 1 show that participants underestimated the duration of the 10 
11 
12 both tasked prospectively. We tested our hypothesis via a 2 (task 1 vs. task 2) × 2 (experimental 
13 
14 vs. control group) × 2 (order of tasks) mixed-model ANOVA, with the proportional error of 15 
16 
17 predicted task duration as the dependent variable. Order of tasks is a control variable that 
18 
19 captured whether participants started with the LEGO® task or the colouring task. Task 1 vs. task 20 
21 
22 2 is the within-subject variable and experimental vs. control group and order of tasks the 
23 
24 between-subject variables. As Table 2 shows, our hypothesis was supported: there was a 
25 
26 
significant task 1 vs. task 2 × experimental vs. control group interaction. The estimated marginal 
28 
29 means of this interaction were -0.36 for task 1 in the control group, -0.28 for task 2 in the control 
30 
31 group, -0.42 for task 1 in the experimental group, and -0.15 for task 2 in the experimental group, 
33 
34 and a post-hoc comparison with a Sidak correction revealed that only the difference within the 
35 
36 experimental group was significant (p < .01). This indicates that if participants had to estimate 37 
38 
39 the duration of a just-completed task, they underestimated the duration of a new and different 
40 
41 task less than if they did not have to estimate the duration of a just-completed task. 42 
43 
44 Furthermore, the ANOVA showed a main effect of task 1 vs. task 2 (i.e., there was an 
45 
46 general decrease in the proportional error of predicted task duration from task 1 to task 2), but no 
1 
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using this value as a basis for the duration prediction on the second task would be expected to 
result in less prediction bias in the experimental group because retrospective estimates on the 
first task were close to actual durations of the first task and the durations of the first and second 
tasks were similar. Thus, it seems that anchoring predictions on the perceived duration of 
previous tasks can explain why learning from mistakes on previous tasks influences task duration 
 
 
34 
7 as the second task was significant (p < .01). This finding suggests that it was those who 
8 
9 underestimated the LEGO® task in the beginning who learned from previous misestimation. 10 
11 
12 
13 
14 Discussion 
15 
16 This study tested the hypothesis that people can learn from misestimating the duration of 17 
18 
19 previous, dissimilar tasks. There was indeed evidence for this: Participants underestimated the 
20 
21 duration of a new and different upcoming task to a lesser extent when they had retrospectively 22 
23 
24 estimated the duration of a just-completed task than if they did not make a retrospective estimate. 
25 
26 This implies that people realise that a previous task took longer than expected and use this 27 
28 
29 information when predicting the duration of a new, unrelated task. Thus, our results suggest that 
30 
31 people can learn from previous misestimation. 
32 
33 The reduction in prediction bias on the second task when the duration of the first task was 
35 
36 retrospectively estimated is consistent with our claim that self-generated anchor values can 
37 
38 influence task duration predictions as well as non-temporal judgements (Epley and Gilovich 39 
40 
41 2005). Specifically, the act of generating a duration estimate for the just-completed, first task led 
42 
43 participants in the experimental group to give longer and less biased predictions on the upcoming 44 
45 
46 second task. Anchoring the retrospective estimate on the perceived duration of the first task and 
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prediction on the second task. Indeed, we found that prediction bias was less on the second task 
than the first task regardless of the retrospective estimation manipulation and which task was 
performed first, which supports our proposed self-learning effect. This finding implies that 
participants in the control and experimental groups took account of the perceived duration of the 
first task when predicting the duration of the second task, but that this self-learning effect was 
 
 
12 
34 
7 Thomas et al. 2007) as an anchor means that this anchoring effect occurs regardless of the 
8 
9 similarity of previous and upcoming tasks. Importantly, our results suggest that the anchoring 10 
11 account (e.g., Thomas and Handley 2008) applies to task duration prediction situations in which 
13 
14 there is no explicit, externally-presented duration information or feedback. 
15 
16 Despite being a minimal manipulation (Cortina and Landis 2009; Prentice and Miller 17 
18 
19 1992), it was effective, with the only difference between the groups being the retrospective 
20 
21 estimation on the first task in the experimental group – an intervention of approximately 10 22 
23 
24 seconds. Participants were never asked to contemplate these estimates, and the experiment 
25 
26 continued immediately after these estimates were made. However, the mere act of having to 27 
28 
29 provide an estimate of previous task duration was found to be sufficient to reduce prediction bias 
30 
31 on a very different task performed subsequently. 
32 
33 Our study can also be considered a conservative test of our hypothesis because 
35 
36 participants in the control group may (or may not) have had thoughts about how long they had 
37 
38 taken to finish the first task, the duration of which they had to estimate before performing that 39 
40 
41 task. Thus, these participants may have also wondered whether the first task took them longer 
42 
43 than predicted. If this was the case, they could also interpret their own bewilderment about being 44 
45 
46 slower than expected as a sign that they should be less optimistic when making a duration 
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enhanced by the act of generating a retrospective estimate on the first task. However, the fact that 
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when making a prediction on the second task or whether participants consciously decided to be 
more cautious in that prediction. Future research could begin to examine the underlying 
mechanism by doing things such as analysing participants’ reported thoughts and manipulating 
whether or not participants predict task duration under time pressure. 
 
 
12 
34 
7 the control group underestimated the duration of the first and second tasks to a similar extent 
8 
9 indicates that people may not spontaneously use retrospective estimates. By conducting verbal 10 
11 protocol analyses to ascertain the reasons given for task duration estimates, future research will 
13 
14 be well-placed to clarify this aspect of our results. 
15 
16 In addition, our results suggests factors beyond those suggested by the memory-bias 17 
18 
19 account (Roy et al. 2005b). According to Roy et al, it is the misremembered memory trace of a 
20 
21 previous task that leads to the underestimation of a new, similar task; but if the length of a new 22 
23 
24 task is estimated, there cannot be a misleading memory (see also Roy and Christenfeld 2007). 
25 
26 Our study employed two dissimilar tasks, and the memory-bias account would thus not predict 27 
28 
29 an effect of our manipulation. This implies that the memory-bias account can only explain some 
30 
31 but not all effects of the planning fallacy phenomenon and task duration misestimation. (We 
32 
33 hasten to add such a position is consistent with proponents of the memory bias account, see, e.g., 
35 
36 Roy et al. 2005a). 
37 
38 Given our findings, a number of avenues exist for future research. In particular, 39 
40 
41 researchers could examine the mechanism underpinning learning from previous misestimation. 
42 
43 Although our results show that such learning occurs, it remains debatable how explicit (or 44 
45 
46 implicit) this learning was - whether participants were merely sensitized to be more cautious 
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Future research could also seek to identify the conditions under which learning from 
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practical point of view (e.g., customers are likely only to complain if the renovation of a store is 
finished several days after rather than before the announced opening day), the psychological 
process that became evident in our study (i.e., that people can learn from experience) should also 
apply to overestimation. For example, the duration of a task that takes only three minutes is 
 
 
12 
34 
7 previous misestimation is more or less likely to occur. In particular, similarity between tasks may 
8 
9 be one such moderating variable because people may be reluctant to transfer the insight of 10 
11 having misestimated the duration of a task to another task if they perceive tasks as dissimilar. For 
13 
14 instance, students may not transfer misestimation experiences from home (e.g., preparing dinner) 
15 
16 to university (e.g., preparing for a course) because they may consider preparing dinner and 17 
18 
19 preparing for a course as belonging to two separates spheres and thus too dissimilar for the 
20 
21 transfer of this insight to be useful. People may also be less likely to transfer if one task is much 22 
23 
24 longer than the other (e.g., students writing a 1000-word essay versus writing a 10000-word 
25 
26 dissertation) because they are perceived as being too dissimilar (although the same psychological 27 
28 
29 processes may cause misestimation, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Roy et al. 2005b). 
30 
31 Another moderating variable may the temporal distance between tasks (cf. Roy and Christenfeld 
32 
33 2007). In our study, participants estimated the duration of the second task directly after finishing 
35 
36 the first task, which made learning particularly likely. However, learning may become less likely 
37 
38 the longer the inter-task temporal interval. 39 
40 
41 Another exciting avenue for research would be to study tasks of very short duration, 
42 
43 which are known to be typically overestimated (Rodon and Meyer 2012; Roy et al. 2005b; cf. 44 
45 
46 Halkjelsvik and Jørgensen 2012). Although studying underestimation is more relevant from a 
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likely to be overestimated, and if people learn from this misestimation, they should make shorter 
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carefully observe how biased their estimates of task duration are in order to stimulate learning 
from these experiences. Furthermore, people should be encouraged to develop a routine of 
retrospective monitoring of how much they underestimated previous task duration so that they 
can keep such information in mind when estimating the duration of upcoming tasks. Given that 
 
 
12 
34 
7 predictions about how long a second subsequent task takes. 
8 
9 Furthermore, if people can learn from experience of estimating in general, as our research 10 
11 shows, this suggests that experience with estimating the duration of a variety of tasks might 
13 
14 matter. One could even speculate that older people might be less prone to the misestimation of 
15 
16 task duration because of their life experience with a variety of tasks - that becoming wiser over 17 
18 
19 the years might also include less biased predictions of task duration. To our knowledge, age 
20 
21 effects have not been studied in the planning fallacy literature, but this could another interesting 22 
23 
24 direction for future research. 
25 
26 We also like to call for more field research in the field of duration misestimation. 27 
28 
29 Laboratory studies like this one are always limited because they study phenomena in artificial 
30 
31 environments and often manipulate only one variable. Although the latter can also be seen as the 
32 
33 strength of the laboratory experiment, we hope that future research finds why to study this in the 
35 
36 field, ideally taking many influential variables into account. 
37 
38 Our study also has an important applied implication because its findings could be used in 39 
40 
41 time management training courses. Within the time management literature (e.g., Claessens et al. 
42 
43 2007; Koch and Kleinmann 2002), the importance of good planning has been acknowledged as a 44 
45 
46 major issue. Our study suggests that time management course attendees could be trained to 
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our manipulation took less than 10 seconds but was effective, such monitoring should be easily 
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12 
7 incorporated into daily life. 
8 
9 Our study provides further evidence of the pivotal role of previous task performance in 10 
11 the task duration prediction process as well as supporting and extending the anchoring account of 
13 
14 misestimation (e.g., Thomas and Handley 2008). Our results suggest that prediction bias is 
15 
16 reduced when people generate feedback on the perceived duration of a previous task and use this 17 
18 
19 performance information as an anchor for estimating the duration of san upcoming task. Given 
20 
21 the cost of underestimating the duration of major projects, the need to more fully understand the 22 
23 
24 task duration prediction process cannot be overstated. 
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Note. PE = proportional error. A negative proportional error indicates underestimation of the task 
 
duration, a positive value overestimation. For half of the participants, task 1 was the LEGO® 
 
assembly task; whereas task 1 was the colouring task for the other half. 
a The proportional error of retrospective task duration (PEretrospection) was calculated analogously 
as the proportional error of predicted task duration. 
 
 
n 
n 
39 
7 Means and Standard Deviations of actual, predicted and recalled duration (in minutes) and 
8 
9 predicted and recalled proportional errors per group and task. 10 
11 
12 Control group 13 (n = 31) 14 
15 
Experimental group 
(n = 32) 
16 
17 
18 Task 1 
19 
M SD M SD 
20 Predicted duration 15.58 7.44 14.59 9.59 21 
22 
23 Actual duration 25.15 8.81 26.58 11.60 
24 
25 Retrospective duration - - 24.00 12.61 26 
27 
28 PEprediction -0.36 0.25 -0.43 0.24 
29 
30 PEretrospectio a - - -0.09 0.27 
31 
32 
33 
34 Task 2 
35 
36 Predicted duration 17.87 7.78 20.34 6.75 37 
38 Actual duration 25.23 8.32 26.23 11.22 
40 
41 Retrospective duration 26.29 12.15 27.03 9.68 
42 
43 PEprediction -0.28 0.27 -0.15 0.32 44 
45 PEretrospectio a 0.03 0.27 0.09 0.35 46 
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Table 2 
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* p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 
 
partial 12 
17 
22 
27 
37 
42 
45 
7 Results of a Mixed-Model ANOVA with the Proportional Error of Predicted Task Duration as 
8 
9 Dependent Variables 10 
11 
Source df SS MS F η2 
13 
14 Within subjects 
15 
16 Task 1 vs. task 2 1 0.90 0.90 16.07** .21 
18 
19 Task 1 vs. task 2 × Experimental vs. control group 1 0.28 0.28 5.04* .08 
20 
21 
Task 1 vs. task 2 × Order of tasks 1 0.42 0.42 7.45** .11 
23 
24 Task 1 vs. task 2 × Experimental vs. control group × 25 
26 
Order of tasks 1 0.11 0.11 1.95 n.s. .03 
28 
29 Error 1 59 3.31 0.06 30 
31 
32 Between subjects 
33 
34 Experimental vs. control group 1 0.04 0.04 0.43 n.s. .01 
35 
36 Order of tasks 1 0.00 0.00 0.10 n.s. .00 
38 
39 Experimental vs. control group × Order of tasks 1 0.07 0.07 0.83 n.s. .01 
40 
41 Error 2 59 5.08 0.09 
43    
44 Note: N = 63. Order of tasks, a control variable, captured whether participants started with the 
46 
47 LEGO® task or the colouring task. 
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Only if necessary: 
Filler tasks 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the experiment. 
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